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A B S T R A C T
Cash transfer programmes form an integral part of nutrition, health, and social protection policies worldwide,
but the mechanisms through which they achieve their health and nutritional impacts are incompletely under-
stood. We present results from a process evaluation of a combined participatory women's groups and cash
transfer programme to improve low birth weight in rural Nepal. We explored the ways in which context, im-
plementation, and mechanism of the intervention aﬀected beneﬁciary women's agency over cash transfers.
Informed by a grounded theory framework, we conducted and analysed semi-structured interviews with 22
beneﬁciary women, 15 of their mothers-in-law, 3 of their elder sisters-in-law and 20 husbands, as well as a focus
group discussion with 7 supervisors of the women's group intervention. Our study reveals how women's group
facilitators, their supervisors and community members developed a shared dynamic around persuading and
compelling recipients of unconditional cash transfers into spending them according to criteria developed by the
group. We found these dynamics eﬀectively constituted ‘soft conditions’ on beneﬁciary spending which re-
stricted women's ability to make decisions over their cash transfers, but also increased their likelihood of
spending them on their own pregnancy. Our ﬁndings demonstrate the importance of understanding how pro-
grammes are implemented and responded to in order to understand their implications for beneﬁciary agency and
empowerment.
1. Introduction
Cash transfer programmes have become a ubiquitous feature of
nutrition, health, and social protection policy worldwide (Honorati
et al., 2016). Cash transfers have been found to have a variety of
beneﬁcial outcomes, including reduced poverty, increased health ser-
vice utilisation, and raised school attendance (Bastagli et al., 2016).
Within nutrition, studies to date have found greater impacts of food
transfers than cash transfers on anthropometric outcomes (Ahmed
et al., 2009; Hidrobo et al., 2014; Saville et al., 2018), but cash transfers
are often preferred in situations where logistical and administrative
diﬃculties with procuring, storing and transporting food are signiﬁcant
(Ahmed et al., 2009). Thus, ﬁnding ways to increase the impact of cash
transfers is desirable. Nevertheless, the pathways through which they
achieve health and nutritional impacts remain incompletely understood
(Gaarder et al., 2010).
Existing theories of change (Gaarder et al., 2010; Leroy et al., 2009;
Groot et al., 2017) emphasise beneﬁciary spending of cash transfers as a
mediator of nutrition and health impact. Cash transfers may enable
beneﬁciaries to pay for higher quantity and quality of food as well as
curative and preventative health visits, transportation to health facil-
ities, and medical supplies. However, beneﬁciary spending of cash
transfers does not happen in a vacuum, but is inﬂuenced by individual
beliefs, attitudes and relationships to other household members
(Zembe-Mkabile et al., 2018; Scott et al., 2017; Tonguet-Papucci et al.,
2017; Junior et al., 2016). These inﬂuences are frequently the target of
complementary behaviour change components (Molyneux and
Thomson, 2011; Attanasio et al., 2009; Barca et al., 2015; Robertson
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et al., 2014; Adato and Hoddinott, 2010), but their mechanism of op-
eration remains little explored.
A notable exception is the literature on ‘labelling’ eﬀects, which
studies the eﬀect of providing clear messages to beneﬁciaries about the
purpose of cash transfers (Benhassine et al., 2015; Pace et al., 2016,
2018; Kilburn et al., 2017). Households often do not treat all income as
fungible, but over-spend cash labelled with a speciﬁc purpose on their
perceived purpose as compared to a generic income eﬀect (Islam and
Hoddinott, 2009; Thaler, 1999; Jacoby, 2002; Beatty et al., 2014). A
cluster randomised controlled trial in Morocco compared conditional
cash transfers – where beneﬁciaries had to send their children to school
to continue to receive them – with labelled cash transfers – where
beneﬁciaries received ﬂyers recommending spending on schooling
(Benhassine et al., 2015). The researchers found both interventions
increased schooling outcomes to an equal extent. They hypothesised
that their labelling component may have encouraged beneﬁciary
households to spend cash on schooling by highlighting its value.
Nonetheless, labelling alone may provide an insuﬃcient nudge to
promote healthy behaviour change in contexts where gender and age
hierarchies restrict young women's access to food and cash (Harris-Fry
et al., 2017). Qualitative studies in Nepal, India and Bangladesh have
found discriminatory food allocation and low decision-making power
prevent high dietary intake during pregnancy (Shannon et al., 2008;
Zaidi, 1996; Morrison et al., 2018). Studies of ﬁnancial power in South
Asia have also found signiﬁcant risks of economic violence and ex-
ploitation by other household members for young women who are
rarely in a position to openly demand access to cash (Chowbey, 2017;
Kabeer, 1997; Singh and Bhandari, 2012; Gram et al., 2018a). In such
contexts, simply labelling cash transfers as belonging to beneﬁciary
women may be insuﬃcient to protect their agency over cash transfers –
i.e. their freedom to spend their transfers without interference from
other household members.
Our present study describes and analyses the process through which
a complementary participatory women's group intervention may have
aﬀected beneﬁciary agency over cash transfers in a combined women's
group and cash transfer intervention to improve birth weight in rural
Nepal (Saville et al., 2018). The cash transfers were ‘unconditional’ in
that there were no formal requirements associated with receiving them,
but ‘labelled’ in that facilitators clearly communicated their purpose in
group meetings as supporting pregnant women's health and nutrition.
However, the women's groups were also designed to go beyond label-
ling by mobilising collective action from community and group mem-
bers to support pregnant women achieve their nutrition and health
goals. A cluster-randomised controlled trial did not ﬁnd a statistically
signiﬁcant impact of cash transfers and women's groups on birthweight
in the ﬁrst 72 h, but inclusion of a larger sample of weights up to 10
days after birth did demonstrate a statistically signiﬁcant 69 g increase
compared with control (Saville et al., 2018). A dietary sub-study also
found substantial improvements in pregnant women's dietary diversity,
micronutrient adequacy, and consumption of dairy foods (Harris-Fry
et al., 2018a).
A key initial hypothesis was that participatory women's groups
could enhance pregnant women's agency over their cash transfers.
Group members might raise awareness about the importance of caring
for women's health or support women to become more conﬁdent in
demanding control over the cash transfer from other household mem-
bers. To explore this hypothesis, we conducted a qualitative process
evaluation (Moore et al., 2015) informed by grounded theory (Corbin
and Strauss, 2008). Our main research question was: how did the
context, implementation and mechanism of our participatory women's
group intervention aﬀect beneﬁciaries' agency over cash transfers?
2. Study setting
2.1. Geographical setting
Our study took place in the Dhanusha and Mahottari districts in the
Plains of Nepal, bordering Bihar state in India. 21% of households are
classiﬁed as ‘severely food insecure’ and levels of undernutrition in
women and girls are high (Ministry of Health and Population (MOHP)
[Nepal], New ERA, & ICF International Inc., 2012). Male foreign labour
migration is widespread with top destinations being India, Qatar, Ku-
wait, United Arab Emirates and Malaysia (Ministry of Labour and
Migration, 2014). The local language and culture is Maithili. Most
married women live with their husband's families in extended family
households. Newly married women's mobility outside the home is re-
stricted by social norms of female propriety and modesty (Davis, 2009);
they are almost always escorted by their husband or an elder male/
female in-law when moving around outside the home (Davis, 2009).
Purchases of goods from the market are almost entirely mediated by
male family members or elder female in-laws (Gram et al., 2018a).
Inside the home, newly married women are expected to defer to their
husband or elder family members in decision-making (Davis, 2009).
Usually, a senior household member, such as the mother-in-law, phy-
sically receives and manages the majority of household income on be-
half of other household members, including her son (Gram et al.,
2018a). Women living in nuclear families have much greater decision-
making power and mobility as the de facto oldest woman of their
household (Gram et al., 2018a).
2.2. Trial setting
Our study was embedded in a cluster-randomised controlled trial
comparing the impact of three interventions on birth weight relative to
control (Saville et al., 2016): 1) women's groups practising participa-
tory learning and action 2) women's groups combined with monthly
unconditional food transfers to pregnant women 3) women's groups
combined with monthly unconditional cash transfers to pregnant
women. The unit of randomisation was the Village Development
Committee (VDC), a sub-district level geographical area with approx-
imate populations of 6000 each. 80 VDCs were randomised to one of
the four above treatments resulting in 20 VDCs per trial arm. Trial in-
terventions ran from 2013 until 2015. Mother Infant Research Activities
(MIRA) implemented trial interventions in collaboration with Uni-
versity College London. The full details of trial design and eventual
outcomes have been reported elsewhere (Saville et al., 2016; Saville
et al., 2018).
2.3. Design of the combined women's groups and cash transfer intervention
Trained facilitators convened and held monthly group meetings
using a pictorial manual. Any women could come to group meetings,
and most pregnant women attended with their mother-in-law.
Facilitators led group members through a cycle of problem identiﬁca-
tion and prioritisation, strategy formulation and implementation, and
participatory evaluation to address local health problems. Facilitators
discussed a wide variety of health and nutrition-related topics using a
pictorial manual, including micronutrient intake, iron supplementation,
deworming medicine, hygiene and sanitation, family support and rest,
antenatal care visits, birth preparedness and newborn care. Facilitators
emphasised the importance of ensuring dietary diversity and particu-
larly recommended spending the cash transfers on micronutrient-rich
foods like vitamin A-rich fruits and vegetables (such as mangoes and
green leafy vegetables), and animal source foods (dairy, eggs, ﬁsh, and
meat), supplemented with home-grown fruits and vegetables.
All pregnant women in a village were eligible for monthly transfers
of NPR 750 once their pregnancy was detected and veriﬁed and a photo
ID card had been issued (Saville et al., 2016). The NPR 750 cash
L. Gram et al. Social Science & Medicine 221 (2019) 9–18
10
transfer comprised 32% of the total monthly cost of a nutritionally
adequate food basket for a pregnant woman in 2011. Cash transfers
were distributed at the end of women's group meetings. Each woman
was asked how they had spent their transfers in the previous month
before being given their next transfer. Registered women were not re-
quired to attend entire meetings to receive their transfer but could pick
it up at the end of a meeting or from a group facilitator the next day.
Registered women who were physically unable to attend received their
transfers at home. A post-distribution monitoring team from Save the
Children performed home visits every month in 5% of beneﬁciary
households asking household members questions on how they had
spent the transfer. Women ceased to be eligible for further transfers
after the end of their pregnancy.
3. Methods
3.1. Study design
We conducted a qualitative process evaluation (Moore et al., 2015)
informed by grounded theory (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). We iterated
between data collection and data analysis and sampled towards sa-
turation to generate a theory of cash transfer use (Corbin and Strauss,
2008; Corbin and Strauss, 2008). We chose grounded theory to max-
imise our chances of inductively developing a nuanced theory with a
coherent logic where all the theoretical categories are connected to one
another and no major explanatory gaps are left.
3.2. Data collection
To collect data on intervention context, implementation and me-
chanisms of eﬀect, we conducted one focus group discussion with 7
women's group supervisors who attended the central oﬃce for a
meeting. Across the women's group and cash arm of the trial, 16 su-
pervisors coached facilitators at monthly meetings, in which they ac-
tively participated themselves to support group facilitators. We took
informed consent from all seven supervisors; none refused.
We also conducted semi-structured interviews with 22 beneﬁciary
women and their guardians, whether mothers-in-law (15) or elder sis-
ters-in-law (3) (Table 1). All interviewees gave informed consent. None
of the beneﬁciary women refused consent, but three guardians refused
consent because they did not have time. In these cases, we still inter-
viewed the beneﬁciary woman alone. The recording of one mother-in-
law was lost due to equipment failure. We purposively sampled to ob-
tain variation in geographical area, caste, socio-economic status, edu-
cation, nuclear versus joint household, and husband's migrant status.
All the sampled beneﬁciaries had received at least three cash transfers.
Due to low levels of ethnic variability in our geographical context, we
did not sample based on ethnicity. We did not explicitly sample guar-
dians based on any criteria, but instead interviewed any consenting
guardian of a sampled daughter-in-law. Locally resident MIRA staﬀ
identiﬁed women matching our sampling criteria and invited them to
participate.
Pilot interviews indicated that mothers-in-law were reluctant to let
us interview their beneﬁciary daughter-in-law in private, while
daughters-in-law felt intimidated by the prospect of discussing house-
hold matters in front of their mother-in-law. We therefore conducted
concurrent but separate interviews with daughters-in-law and their
guardian, in two separate locations around the household. While the
daughter-in-law was interviewed in her room, the guardian was si-
multaneously interviewed in an outside location, such as under a tree or
in a nearby ﬁeld. This ensured a high degree of privacy for the
daughter-in-law, as male household members were at work and other
female household members may have presumed our interview with the
mother-in-law was more signiﬁcant and of greater interest. A similar
strategy has been used during interviews in high-income settings to
separate married women from their husbands (Hertz, 1995).
We interviewed 20 husbands from households that participated in
the trial (Table 2). Husbands were sampled based on variation in geo-
graphical area, caste, socio-economic status, education, and nuclear
versus joint household. We used the surveillance system of the trial to
identify them. We did not revisit the original households where we had
interviewed female household members because there was a delay of
three months between data collection with men and women due to
funding constraints and we sought to minimise time burdens on
households. Therefore, husbands were unrelated to our earlier female
respondents. All husbands gave informed consent. It was often diﬃcult
to ﬁnd a suitable time to interview husbands due to their need to leave
for work early in the morning and spend time with the family in the
evening. Five refused to participate because they did not have time.
One expressed oﬀence at being asked questions that ‘should be asked of
women only’. All husbands were interviewed alone under a tree in an
open ﬁeld.
Author NSh conducted interviews with beneﬁciary women, while
female women's group supervisors interviewed their mothers-in-law or
elder sisters-in-law. NSh also conducted the focus group discussion with
women's group supervisors. A male researcher interviewed male re-
spondents. All interviewers were native Maithili speakers. NSh and the
women's group supervisors had previous experience with conducting
interviews for MIRA NGO, while the male interviewer was directly
trained by authors LG and JM to conduct interviews.
Data were collected from April until November 2015. All interviews
were audiotaped and lasted between one and two hours. Native Maithili
speakers directly transcribed and translated the data from the audio
recording into written English.
3.3. Data analysis
For each transcript, reﬂective notes were written using analytical
tools from grounded theory followed by open, axial and selective
coding (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Coding was carried out in MAXQDA
2018. We triangulated our ﬁndings between daughters-in-law, mothers-
in-law/sisters-in-law, husbands and NGO supervisors to explore the
extent that our concepts were shared across staﬀ and household
members.
Author LG performed the coding and analysis of the translated data.
LG was resident in Nepal for most of the period from the 1st of April
until the 1st of September 2015 and worked with the NSh and other
interviewers during this period. To ensure analytic rigour, LG, NSh and
other interviewers discussed ﬁndings and interpretations of the data
throughout data collection. LG also listened to the audio ﬁles and
consulted with interviewers and translators throughout the analysis to
check understanding of transcripts and avoid cultural bias in the in-
terpretation of the data. Senior co-authors who were permanent re-
sidents of Nepal reviewed the data (JM) and the presentation of themes
and discussion (JM and NSa) to reduce bias, stimulate reﬂective ana-
lysis and reduce the inﬂuence of LG's position.
4. Results
In the following sections, we present our results using the UK
Medical Research Council's process evaluation framework (Moore et al.,
2015): context refers to the social, economic and cultural factors
shaping the implementation and mechanism of an intervention; im-
plementation refers to intervention delivery such as the training and
performance of staﬀ or the reach and coverage of an intervention;
mechanism refers to participant responses and interactions with an in-
tervention and causal mediators of intervention impact; output refers to
beneﬁciary agency over cash transfers. Quotes are labelled with pseu-
donyms for the areas where interviews were conducted and a serial
number. Quotes from the focus group discussion with women's group
supervisors are marked [FGD].
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4.1. Context
4.1.1. Low perceived purchasing power of cash transfers
Across the wealth spectrum, beneﬁciary women stated that the
transfer was a small amount of money or “nothing” [beneﬁciary 6,
Kote], they would “eat nothing” if its size was halved [beneﬁciary 4,
Kote], and “nothing could be bought” with it [beneﬁciary 1, Jamal]. For
poorer families, the transfer was not perceived to be enough to meet
their food needs, as rapid inﬂation during the study period decreased
the purchasing power of the transfer. For better-oﬀ families, the NPR
750 [USD 6.98 in July 2016] transfer appeared an insigniﬁcant amount
when compared with foreign remittance income that they often re-
ceived (NPR 20,000–100,000 monthly per earner) as well as compared
with costs of maternity care (NPR 50,000 for a C-section, NPR
2000–10,000 for ultra-sound scans, and NPR 3500–8000 for an an-
tenatal care visit).
The low perceived purchasing power of the cash transfer was ex-
acerbated by a widespread belief by households that the group facil-
itators had explicitly endorsed feeding apples and pomegranates, some
of the most expensive non-meat foods available, to the pregnant woman
“in maximum quantity” [elder sister-in-law 3, Jamal]. One kg of apples
cost NPR 100–180, while one kg of pomegranate cost NPR 200–300,
thus nearly the entirety of the monthly transfer could be spent on
buying 4–7 kg apples or 3–4 kg pomegranates. Compared to such prices,
half a litre of milk cost only NPR 25, potatoes cost NPR 20 per kg, rice
cost NPR 50 per kg, and lentils cost NPR 100 per kg. Meat and ﬁsh cost
NPR 300–400 per kg and one bottle of beer cost NPR 250. Ironically,
the high price of apples and pomegranates itself may have served to
signal their nutritional value “The [facilitators] had told us to eat good
things and you know that good things cost a lot” [daughter-in-law 6,
Sahku]. A local belief also held that pomegranates build blood for the
unborn baby due to their red colour.
The low perceived purchasing power of cash transfers created sig-
niﬁcant diﬃculties for group facilitators and their supervisors with
communicating the value of the cash transfer.
Women's group supervisor: Those who have money, they say that
NPR 750 is nothing and more should be added to it. But we told
them that NPR 750 is a big amount if you know how to use it …
there is no limit to the need of money … everyone has thousands
and thousands of rupees, but they do not spend it on food. They
spend it on building big houses if they have small ones, or on buying
ﬁelds … [But] even they themselves cannot aﬀord to donate NPR
750 to someone just like that. No. What those NPR 750 rupees can




4.2.1. Emergent negotiations over cash transfer use
Originally, group facilitators were only meant to provide broad re-
commendations to spend the transfer on micronutrient-rich foods for
pregnant women and reﬂect on ways to enhance women's agency over
cash transfers in an open-ended manner with group members, if ne-
cessary. However, their diﬃculties with communicating the value of
the cash transfer catalysed fears that families might conﬁscate it or that
beneﬁciaries might ‘waste’ [FGD] it on non-health-related purposes and
Table 1
Female respondent characteristics.
Household characteristics Mother-in-law/Elder sister-in-law to
beneﬁciary
Beneﬁciary woman




Family relation Grades passed Age Grades passed Pregnant?
1 Sahku Dalit Middle Joint No Mother-in-law 0 20 7 No, baby 5 months
2 Sahku Dalit Low Nuclear Yes, ME Mother-in-law 0 25 0 No, baby 7 months
3 Sahku Brahmin High Joint No Sister-in-law 7 21 8 No, baby 6 months
4 Sahku Brahmin High Joint No Mother-in-law 0 21 8 No, baby 4 months
5 Sahku Middle
Madhesi




Middle Joint No Mother-in-law 0 21 5 Yes, 7 months
7 Sahku Middle
Madhesi
High Joint Yes, ME Mother-in-law 0 24 8 No, baby 5 months
8 Sahku Brahmin High Joint No Mother-in-law 7 20 12 No
9 Sahku Dalit Low Joint No Mother-in-law 0 30 0 No, baby 5 months
10 Sahku Middle
Madhesi
High Nuclear No MIL refused consent 21 0 Yes, 8 months
1 Kote Dalit Middle Joint No Mother-in-law 0 20 14 Yes, 8 months
2 Kote Dalit Low Nuclear No Equipment failure 25 5 No, baby 5 months
3 Kote Dalit Low Joint Yes, ME Sister-in-law 0 18 6 No, baby 1 month
4 Kote Dalit Low Joint Yes Mother-in-law 0 25 8 No
5 Kote Dalit Middle Nuclear Yes, ME Mother-in-law 0 25 0 Yes, 7 months
6 Kote Dalit Middle Joint No Mother-in-law 0 20 0 No, baby 1 month
7 Kote Dalit Middle Joint No Mother-in-law 0 22 12 No, baby 7 months
8 Kote Middle
Madhesi
Low Joint Deceased Mother-in-law 0 20 3 No, baby 2 months




High Joint Yes, Malaysia Mother-in-law 0 25 8 No, baby 6 months
3 Jamal Dalit Low Nuclear No Sister-in-law 0 25 8 No, baby 3 months
4 Jamal Dalit Low Joint Yes, Delhi MIL refused consent 17 5 No
ME=Middle East. Socioeconomic status was appraised by local informants and adjusted based on interview data in case of discrepancies. Destination country of
migration was not reported for respondent 4, Kote and 1, Jamal. Ages for mothers-in-law/elder sisters-in-law not provided, as mothers-in-law had diﬃculties
reporting their age exactly, although it ranged from 50 to 80 years. All respondents were of Hindu faith. For daughters-in-law 8 from Sahku, 4 from Kote and 4 Jamal,
the age of the baby was not reported.
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forego an opportunity to improve birth weight. To prevent this, group
facilitators and their supervisors decided to create budgeting re-
commendations and ‘rules’ [FGD].
First, facilitators and their supervisors created a recommendation
advising families to spend approximately NPR 25 a day over one month
on milk. Facilitators used a picture of a calendar from their manual to
make this point clear. However, poor families complained that they
could not justify spending the entire cash transfer on only milk, when
they could not aﬀord staple foods, while wealthier families wanted to
make bulk purchases of more expensive fruits; they may have had
plenty of access to own-produced milk. In response to such requests, the
facilitators created an additional ‘rule’ [FGD] that wealthier partici-
pants should plan ahead so that expenditures averaged out to NPR 25 a
day, while poorer participants should spend half the money on milk and
half on staple foods. However, families also wanted to save up their
cash transfer to plan for private maternity and delivery care.
Facilitators responded to such requests by creating a third re-
commendation advising families not to spend their cash transfer on
delivery costs, but to save up money from other sources. Finally, fa-
cilitators and their supervisors felt beneﬁciary women might beneﬁt
from an explicit recommendation to households to let beneﬁciaries
control the cash transfers. After asking group members if they approved
of such a rule and receiving an answer in the aﬃrmative, facilitators
announced another ‘rule and regulation’ [FGD] that beneﬁciary women
had to physically keep their cash transfers.
4.2.2. Enforcing recommended usage of cash transfers
Group facilitators and their supervisors worried that simply dis-
seminating recommendations on cash transfer use was insuﬃcient to
achieve successful outcomes [FGD]. Therefore, facilitators and their
supervisors began to take more active measures to promote compliance.
In early group meetings, they observed beneﬁciaries handing over their
cash transfers to their mothers-in-law as soon as they received them.
Facilitators and their supervisors decided to intervene whenever they
observed them handing over their cash transfer to other family
members [FGD].
To ensure households spent the transfer as recommended, some
facilitators and their supervisors personally visited households sus-
pected of not following spending guidance based on information from
community members to ‘cross-examine’ [FGD] household members.
Such cross-examinations were not always conducted in a supportive
manner: One beneﬁciary narrated how a facilitator would repeatedly
ask her about her spending behaviour and asked to be shown the fruit
she had purchased with the cash transfer. To indicate the level of per-
ceived scrutiny, the beneﬁciary woman used the expression ‘She even
knows how much salt I put in pulses while cooking!’ [beneﬁciary 3, Jamal].
Social pressures also arose in the monthly women's group meetings,
when facilitators and women's group members reviewed and discussed
how they had spent the preceding month's cash transfers. Women's
group supervisors acknowledged that these were meant to be open
discussions held under the premise that women had the right to the
transfer and could spend it however they liked [FGD]. However, facil-
itators' eagerness to encourage women to adopt the desired behaviours
may have led some to apply more pressure than intended. One super-
visor provided a message to her community that if they did not spend
the money as instructed and wasted her time by producing unhealthy
children, she would stop coming to the community to distribute cash.
Women's group supervisor: We told them that there wouldn't be any
further cash transfers, if we did not come and sit with them, and we
had chosen to spend so much time there so that their children could
grow up healthy and sound. If the children didn't grow up healthy,
then it was of no use to us to come and spend so much time. The
women who were not pregnant, like the mothers-in-law, they were
telling the pregnant women that if they were not willing to come to
the women's group, there would be too few people in the group and
we would not be coming any longer. Then no more money would be
given, and they would be banished from our oﬃces. That was why,




Serial no. Area Caste SES Nuclear/joint household Age Grades passed Interview taken? Wife pregnant?
1 Dahak Middle Madhesi II Nuclear 40 0 Yes No, baby 1 month old
2 Dahak Middle Madhesi IV Joint 30 9 No, consent refusal No, baby 18 days' old
3 Dahak Middle Madhesi IV Nuclear 26 4 Yes No, baby 17 days' old
4 Dahak Middle Madhesi V Joint 28 8 Yes No, baby 2 months old
5 Dahak Dalit I Nuclear 30 0 No, consent refusal No, baby 1 month old
6 Dahak Dalit I Joint ? 0 Yes No, baby 6 months old
7 Dahak Middle Madhesi IV Joint 22 11 Yes No, baby 1 month old
8 Dahak Middle Madhesi I Joint 23 4 Yes No, wife had an abortion
9 Dahak Middle Madhesi V Joint 28 13 No, consent refusal Unknown
10 Dahak Muslim I Joint 26 0 No, moved abroad Unknown
11 Dahak Dalit I ? ? 0 No, consent refusal Unknown
1 Lalit Middle Madhesi III Joint 23 6 Yes No, baby 14 days' old
2 Lalit Middle Madhesi V Joint 38 8 Yes No, baby 1 month old
3 Lalit Middle Madhesi I Joint 32 6 Yes No, baby 1 month old
4 Lalit Middle Madhesi III Joint 31 0 Yes Yes
5 Lalit Middle Madhesi II Nuclear 29 0 Yes Yes
6 Lalit Middle Madhesi IV Nuclear 41 8 Yes Yes
7 Lalit Middle Madhesi III Joint 24 11 Yes No, baby 1 month old
8 Lalit Dalit II Joint 24 5 No, consent refusal Unknown
9 Lalit Middle Madhesi V Joint 26 10 No, moved abroad Unknown
1 Jamal Middle Madhesi V Joint 28 6 Yes No, baby 1 month old
2 Jamal Middle Madhesi III Nuclear 32 5 Yes No, baby 1 month old
3 Jamal Dalit I Joint 25 0 Yes No, baby 1 day old
4 Jamal Muslim III Joint 35 0 Yes Yes
5 Jamal Middle Madhesi III Joint 28 0 Yes No, wife suﬀered miscarriage
6 Jamal Muslim III Nuclear 44 0 Yes No, baby died
7 Jamal Middle Madhesi V Joint 25 7 Yes No, baby 2 months old
8 Jamal Muslim I Joint 40 0 No, consent refusal Unknown
SES reﬂects socioeconomic quintiles calculated using an asset index (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001) from surveillance data, I= lowest socioeconomic status,
V=highest. Husbands 6 and 11 in Dahak did not provide information on their age. Husband 11 in Dahak did not provide information on family structure.
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Another supervisor told women's group members that the trial in-
tervention would be translated into permanent government policy if
beneﬁciaries demonstrated the potential for the intervention to prevent
low birth weight, even though no such arrangement existed between
MIRA NGO and the Nepal government ‘What is wrong with giving an
example? It is only to inspire them’ [FGD]. A third supervisor described
how she ‘cross-examined’ [FGD] group members because she wanted to
be sure they had not spent their cash transfer on clothes or jewellery. A
fourth supervisor stated that women's group participants only ended up
spending the cash transfer on food after facilitators ‘again and again told
them to spend the money on food to eat’ [FGD]. A ﬁfth supervisor reported
how she had criticised a women's group member spending the transfer
on medicines for her children instead of following their guidelines on
spending [FGD].
4.3. Mechanism
4.3.1. Community action on cash transfer use
In responding to the implementation modality adopted by facil-
itators and supervisors, community members began taking informal
action themselves to promote perceived appropriate use of cash trans-
fers. Beneﬁciaries and their household members indicated community
members would informally gossip about, reprimand or castigate
households perceived to waste the cash transfer. A mother-in-law stated
that if her daughter-in-law was still living together with her in a joint
family and she took her cash transfer from her daughter-in-law, then
people might start gossiping about her in the village [mother-in-law 5,
Sahku]. An elder sister-in-law noted how community members would
accuse pregnant women's guardians of taking cash transfers away from
them if children were found to be low birth weight by a local clinic
[elder sister-in-law 3, Jamal]. Many husbands remarked the purpose of
the cash transfers was well-known to the wider community and thus
community members would ‘verbally abuse’ people known to ‘not to
spend money on what they are told to spend it on’ [husband 3, Dahak].
Consequently, household members widely condemned spending on
items unrelated to health such as cosmetics, clothes or jewellery and
ubiquitously asserted that the cash transfer ought to be spent on food,
both spontaneously and when prompted to discuss the purpose of the
cash transfer. One husband remarked that if his wife did not spend her
cash transfer on food, he would demand an account of why she had not
done as instructed by the women's group facilitators [husband 2,
Jamal]. Another husband commented that the cash transfer programme
was a huge investment that might not be made again, if households did
not spend their transfers as instructed 'there is no point giving cash to
women who don't spend it the way they are told to spend it' [husband 3,
Lalit]. A third husband stated that households were accountable to the
women's groups for their use of the cash transfer, just like local oﬃcials
are accountable to the community for their use of government budgets:
Husband: If local government oﬃcers are provided a budget to build
a school, but instead of that spend the money on building houses for
themselves then it is a bad thing … It is the duty of the women's
groups to ﬁnd out if people have actually spent the money as told.
[husband 1, Lalit]
As such, supervisors widely believed beneﬁciary households felt the
cash transfer was labelled with a health and nutrition-related purpose
“We give them the money to buy food, thus they feel that they have to buy
food with it” [FGD]. Supervisors thought beneﬁciaries would feel awk-
ward and embarrassed if it was revealed that they had spent the cash
diﬀerently from its stated purpose and even thought women's own fa-
mily members might inform the local women's group about such be-
haviour [FGD]. To describe women's fear of both personal and social
feelings of guilt and shame, supervisors cited the Nepali proverb ‘It is
not the tiger of the forest that eats you alive, but the tiger of your own mind’/
ban ko baghle nakhaeko, man ko baghle khaeko.
4.3.2. Perceived need for compliance with NGO
The many social pressures from both their community and MIRA
NGO aﬀected beneﬁciary women's interpretation of the meaning of
their cash transfer. Beneﬁciary women sometimes denied making their
own decisions on cash transfer use. Instead, they stated that NGO staﬀ
had taken this decision for them.
Interviewer: Who took decisions regarding use of the cash transfer in
the household?
Beneﬁciary woman: The women's group facilitator took decisions
about this.
Interviewer: Okay. But when you received the cash transfers then
who took decisions regarding the use of that money?
Beneﬁciary woman: That decision was done by that Sir who had
asked me whether we spend that money on food for ourselves or
whether we give it to our family members.
[beneﬁciary 9, Sahku]
When asked if they had saved the cash transfer or spent it on non-
food items, beneﬁciary women usually replied with a question about
how this was possible, when they had not been told to spend their cash
transfer in this way.
Interviewer: Now tell me sister, were you free to spend the cash
transfer on whatever you liked to spend it on?
Beneﬁciary woman: No, how could I spend it on whatever I liked to
spend it on?
Interviewer: Why not?
Beneﬁciary woman: Since it was given to me to spend exclusively on
food then how could I spend it on other things?
[beneﬁciary 10, Sahku]
One elder sister-in-law even seemed confused about the idea that
there existed women who did not spend their cash transfer on food ‘If
they have not spent the cash transfer on that, then what did they spend their
cash on?’ [elder sister-in-law 3, Jamal]. Mothers-in-law and elder sis-
ters-in-law also widely explained that their daughters-in-law had not
saved any of the cash transfer as they had not been told to do so by the
NGO.
Interviewer: Did [your daughter-in-law] ever save any of the cash
transfer?
Mother-in-law: She has not saved any of the cash transfer, because
she was not told to do so? She was given the money to spend on
fruits and vegetables. If she had been told to save, then she might
save.
[mother-in-law 2, Sahku]
Women's group supervisors believed beneﬁciaries feared they might
stop receiving the cash transfer if they were found not to have spent it
on food ‘[They think] the oﬃce will catch them’ [FGD]. However, only
one respondent, a husband, explicitly stated a belief that such a thing
could happen [husband, 4 Jamal]. Another husband remarked, since
community members had never observed households lose their cash
transfer over how they spent it, most did not worry overly about losing
their cash transfer in this way [husband 7, Dahak]. Many respondents
also thought it would be challenging for our NGO to monitor how
people privately spent their money, particularly as the cash received by
the NGO was sometimes physically mixed in with cash from other
sources by the beneﬁciaries. However, a few respondents indicated a
belief the NGO could ﬁnd out if women had eaten the food they were
supposed to eat by recording and cross-checking the answers of dif-
ferent household members [husband 7, Jamal] or measuring the weight
of the baby that was eventually born [husband 8, Dahak; elder sister-in-
law 3, Jamal]. Supervisors also reported receiving news from
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community informants about households' use of cash transfers [FGD].
4.4. Output
4.4.1. Beneﬁciary agency over cash transfers
Despite group facilitators and their supervisors' attempts to ex-
plicitly intervene when beneﬁciary women handed over their cash
transfers to their mother-in-law, many beneﬁciaries simply waited until
they got home before they oﬀered it to their mother-in-law. Such
beneﬁciaries thought it inconceivable that they could openly refuse the
authority of their mother-in-law by keeping their cash transfer without
even attempting to oﬀer it to their guardian. However, in almost all
cases, both daughter-in-law and mother-in-law independently con-
ﬁrmed that the mother-in-law had refused to accept the cash and in-
stead insisted that the daughter-in-law should spend it on whatever she
wanted to spend it on – as long it was recommended by our NGO. When
asked why they had not accepted the transfer, mothers-in-law replied
with a mixture of reasons: that it belonged to the beneﬁciary, that it was
for her beneﬁt, that they were instructed to do so, and that the transfer
was of a negligible size anyway.
Such beneﬁciary households overwhelmingly stated that they spent
their cash transfer on dairy and fruits for the pregnant woman, sug-
gesting women's group facilitators and their supervisors largely suc-
ceeded in their attempts to ensure beneﬁciaries spent their cash trans-
fers in line with their recommendations. Indeed, by far the most
commonly reported pattern of expenditure was half a litre of cow milk
daily at NPR 25, exactly as recommended by group facilitators, while
the most commonly reported non-dairy products were apples and po-
megranates. Other fruits and green vegetables were occasionally men-
tioned. Beneﬁciary women almost always relied on husbands or mo-
thers-in-law to physically spend the transfer for them when they needed
to purchase fruit due to female seclusion norms preventing young,
married women from entering the marketplace.
It was clear that beneﬁciaries were only allowed to make ‘their own’
spending decisions concerning cash transfers, but not generic cash.
When asked if their daughter-in-law was allowed to have cash savings
in general, many mothers-in-law baulked at the suggestion and aﬃrmed
they as mothers-in-law were entitled to manage household income as a
senior household member. When asked if their receipt of the cash
transfers had led them to experience greater household decision-
making power, beneﬁciaries usually answered with a degree of amu-
sement: “Such a small amount of money won't grant anyone any kind of
power!” [beneﬁciary 6, Kote]. Beneﬁciaries similarly denied experien-
cing greater household status after attending group meetings.
Husbands living in extended families were not oﬀered the cash
transfer, as the household hierarchy dictated deferring to in-laws before
the husband in ﬁnancial matters. In nuclear families, beneﬁciaries
managed day-to-day ﬁnancial transactions as the de facto oldest woman
of their household; these reported spending their transfer on fruits and
dairy. Only in one instance did a beneﬁciary ‘let’ her husband make
decisions on the use of the cash transfer, as he insisted spending it on
apples and pomegranates for her anyway [beneﬁciary 5, Sahku]. When
asked why they had not taken the cash transfer, husbands also replied
that the cash transfer was too small for them to care about and it was
meant for their wife's health.
None of our respondents reported conﬂicts with husbands or mo-
thers-in-law, but two beneﬁciaries reported conﬂicts with their elder
sisters-in-law [beneﬁciary 3, Jamal; beneﬁciary 7, Kote]. In one in-
stance, a beneﬁciary secretly spent the cash transfer food on fruits for
herself with the help of her husband, as her elder sister-in-law wanted
to conﬁscate the transfer [beneﬁciary 3, Jamal]. In another instance,
physical violence erupted between the beneﬁciary and her elder sister-
in-law, when the beneﬁciary openly denied a request by her elder sister-
in-law for the cash transfer [beneﬁciary 7, Kote]. In both these in-
stances, it was unclear whether conﬂict was triggered by the cash
transfer or whether it was a continuation of a pre-existing pattern of
antagonism.
In extremely poor households, where food security was a matter of
survival [beneﬁciary 4, Kote] or the family was so in debt they were at
risk of eviction [beneﬁciary 3, Kote], a senior in-law received and spent
the transfer on meat, ﬁsh or staples for the whole family instead of dairy
or fruits for the pregnant woman. Beneﬁciary women in such house-
holds stated they shared out of duty, solidarity, charity and necessity.
Beneﬁciary woman: I had to give the cash transfer to my mother-in-
law. Since we had nothing at home to eat, then it was my duty to
give money to buy rice, salt, oil and other things for the kitchen … I
had given her [the cash transfer] so that she could buy food for all of
us in the family and I too had eaten what she bought.
[beneﬁciary 4, Kote]
Even so, such they often felt spontaneously required to justify not
spending their cash transfer on fruits or dairy; for example, the above
beneﬁciary woman exclaimed ‘How can you stay alive eating exclusively
apples and pomegranates?’ [beneﬁciary 4, Kote]
5. Discussion
We showed how the context, implementation, and mechanism of a
participatory women's group intervention created multiple, inter-
locking forms of social pressure on beneﬁciary women and their fa-
milies to spend cash transfers on foods recommended by our NGO staﬀ.
Our observed mechanism may help explain how the combined women's
group and cash transfer intervention achieved substantial improve-
ments in dietary diversity, micronutrient adequacy, consumption of
dairy foods, and relative intra-household allocation of dairy foods to
pregnant women (Harris-Fry et al., 2018a), even if it may not have
translated into impact on birthweight (Saville et al., 2018). In a context
in which pregnant women are expected to eat least and last (Morrison
et al., 2018), are perceived as having less need of nutrition than other
household members (Morrison et al., 2018), and are found to have the
lowest level of energy intake and micronutrient adequacy among adult
household members (Harris-Fry et al., 2018b), improving their ability
to spend cash on their own nutrition was a signiﬁcant achievement.
The observed agreement between our qualitative ﬁndings – in
which most respondents reported spending their cash on milk and fruit
– and the quantitative ﬁndings of an independent dietary sub-study
(Harris-Fry et al., 2018a) – in which micronutrient adequacy and con-
sumption of dairy improved – suggests limited social desirability bias in
our interview data. Our ﬁndings mirror pilot data from the trial sur-
veillance system in early 2014, which found that 84 of 86 households
reported spending their cash transfer on food for the pregnant women.
Triangulating between the reports of mothers-in-law, elder sisters-in-
law and beneﬁciaries from the same household did not reveal sig-
niﬁcant discrepancies between reported behaviours. Furthermore, most
respondents, whether beneﬁciary woman, husband or mother-in-law,
showed little inhibition in stating that the cash transfers were too small
to make a diﬀerence to their lives and that future programmes should
provide larger transfers. Nonetheless, we cannot eliminate the possi-
bility that women tried to protect themselves from loss of standing with
MIRA NGO when they asserted that they believed the cash transfers
ought to be spent as instructed, even if such behaviour would in itself
signal social pressure to appear compliant.
We believe the process through which women were encouraged to
spend cash on their own nutrition most closely resembles the experi-
ence of a cash transfer programme in Lesotho (Pace et al., 2016, 2018)
in which complementary labelling and messaging components spurred
communities to police beneﬁciary spending of cash transfers against
perceived waste. In our case, NGO staﬀ were motivated to create and
enforce spending recommendations for our cash transfers by fears that
household members would fail to see their potential value for women's
pregnancy and so conﬁscate them for their own purposes. NGO re-
commendations were not purely top-down driven but emerged out of an
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interactive process between group members, their facilitators and their
supervisors which resulted in a group consensus. As group facilitators,
their supervisors and community members enthusiastically promoted
compliance, a social norm was created, which strongly compelled
beneﬁciary women to spend their cash transfer on recommended foods,
while considering purchases of ‘frivolous’ or ‘wasteful’ items, such as
cosmetics or jewellery, socially unacceptable. This enabled most ben-
eﬁciaries to spend cash on their own pregnancy, while preventing them
from spending it on non-health purposes or on other household mem-
bers' well-being. Moreover, households in extreme poverty and food
insecurity still purchased and shared staple foods for the whole family.
Our initial hypothesis that women's groups might empower bene-
ﬁciaries to exercise greater agency over cash transfers does not seem to
have held. In fact, our conception of agency as rooted in non-inter-
ference from other household members seems to have been too narrow
for a setting where constraints on women's use of cash came from
community and NGO members in addition to household members.
Under a broader deﬁnition of agency as non-interference from either
household, community or NGO members, we might say our women's
group intervention actually circumscribed beneﬁciary agency by con-
straining them to spend cash on health-related purposes.
Such constraints can be viewed as a form of ‘soft conditioning’ on
transfer use (Pace et al., 2016, 2018; Skovdal et al., 2013). ‘Hard’
conditions refer to formal requirements for continued receipt of cash
transfers which are enforced by an external implementing agent. ‘Soft’
conditions refer to implicit constraints on transfer use that arise from
community members' own interpretation of programme guidelines. No
formal requirements existed for beneﬁciaries in our programme to
spend cash transfers on their own pregnancy, but community members
and local women's group facilitators sometimes took it upon themselves
to enforce this anyway.
A theory of how the context, implementation and mechanism of our
participatory women's group intervention circumscribed beneﬁciary
agency over cash transfers should account for three phenomena: con-
certive control, imperfect implementation and labelling. ‘Concertive
control’ (Barker, 1993) refers to strategies of collective control whereby
groups invent and enforce own rules of behaviour based on their in-
terpretations of an evolving value consensus. In a notable ethnography
of ‘participatory democracy’ at the workplace in the United States,
Barker (1993) observed how newly created, self-managed work teams
gradually imposed ever-more formalistic rules of reward and punish-
ment on themselves to satisfy their value consensus until they had ef-
fectively replaced their former top-down bureaucracy with a bottom-up
bureaucracy of their own making.
Despite clear diﬀerences in context, this process may serve as a
model for our study, as we similarly observed group facilitators, group
members and community members creating and enforcing their own
rules of transfer use based on their interpretations of what these
transfers were for. Of particular resonance is Barker's (1993) observa-
tion that concertive control can be more powerful and pervasive than
top-down management, because group members are always around to
watch each other, whereas managers can only monitor a few at a time.
In our case, beneﬁciary women were put under the ‘eye of the norm’
(Barker, 1993) through the eﬀorts of NGO and community members to
monitor their usage of cash. This limited their ability to spend cash on
non-health purposes but enhanced their ability to spend it on their own
pregnancy.
Imperfect implementation limited the bottom-up nature of our in-
tervention in some areas, as one group supervisor threatened to with-
draw cash transfers, if women in the community did not follow their
recommendations, and another promised universal instantiation of the
programme if they did so. No such contingencies existed in our inter-
vention. Gaarder (2012) commented on the invariable risk of imperfect
implementation in real-world unconditional cash transfer programmes
and asked whether ﬁeld staﬀ on the ground ‘know and understand the
implication of unconditionality [or] agree and communicate it in that
spirit’. Qualitative studies of cash transfer programmes in Peru, In-
donesia and Nicaragua have found programme oﬃcers ‘empowering
themselves’ to collect receipts from beneﬁciaries with the warning that
the transfers would stop if they wasted the money, even though no such
legal condition existed (Jones et al., 2007; Syukri et al., 2010; Adato
and Roopnaraine, 2010).
In our trial, imperfect implementation may have created confusion
around cash transfer policy. Even if few beneﬁciaries explicitly stated
that the cash transfer was conditional in our interviews, our NGO staﬀ
thought this belief might have arisen. Previous studies in Malawi,
Ecuador, Morocco and Zimbabwe have found 27–70% of households
receiving unconditional cash transfers believing they were in fact
conditional (Benhassine et al., 2015; Robertson et al., 2013; Schady and
Araujo, 2008; Kilburn et al., 2017). Indeed, a few respondents in our
sample stated a belief that our NGO could ﬁnd out if women had eaten
the food they were supposed to eat by measuring the weight of the baby
that was eventually born. If respondents believed their community
could stop receiving cash transfers in this way, they may have felt
forced to shift spending in accordance with perceived instructions.
Direct messages from facilitators in group meetings concerning the
purpose of the cash transfer interacted with concertive control and
some instances of imperfect implementation to alter the ‘social
meaning’ (Zelizer, 1989) of cash transfers. Beneﬁciary women, house-
hold members, and NGO staﬀ universally aﬃrmed that beneﬁciaries
ought to spend their transfer on food, because they were given it to
spend on food, and strongly condemned spending on non-food pur-
poses. Particularly striking is the analogy drawn by one husband be-
tween household spending of cash transfers and bureaucrat spending of
government funds (Section 4.3.1) given the fact that labelling eﬀects
were ﬁrst discovered in the context of local government spending
(Courant et al., 1978). As a result, household members and beneﬁciary
women may have felt a strong obligation to spend cash on NGO-ap-
proved purposes and enforce such spending within their own house-
hold. Indeed, the transfers seem to have become so strongly associated
with NGO compliance in the minds of some respondents that they
seemed confused about the very idea that beneﬁciaries could spend
cash transfers in their own way.
The extent to which the observed lack of agency expansion should
concern policy-makers depends on their assumptions, theories and va-
lues. First, soft conditions on cash transfers may be ineﬃcient if bene-
ﬁciaries are better informed about optimal use of cash than social
planners. For example, in our study, group facilitators' budgetary re-
commendations were strictly not evidence-based but emerged out of a
consensus attempt at collectively making the best use of available re-
sources. There is no evidence that drinking half a litre of milk a day
improves birthweight, only broad evidence that dietary diversity and
micronutrient adequacy is important (Bhutta et al., 2013). Nonetheless,
group facilitators and members were arguably better informed about
ways to enhance nutrition and health as a collective than individual
beneﬁciaries and their budgetary recommendations and guidelines
might have helped translate vague notions of optimal diet into concrete
action.
Second, soft conditions may be considered paternalistic from a
human rights perspective, particularly if the purpose of programmes is
to mitigate the eﬀects of extreme poverty. However, only classic liberal
theorists deﬁne freedom as the absence of external interference (Berlin,
1959). Republican theorists (Pettit, 1997) deﬁne freedom as the pre-
sence of legitimate institutions that prevent arbitrary interference; thus,
collectively self-imposed rules are exactly the type of situation that
enable freedom. Indeed, republicans may argue behavioural constraints
designed by the NGO and the community to promote pregnant women's
health and nutrition carry greater legitimacy than arbitrary conﬁscation
of cash transfers by other household members. More broadly, collec-
tively agreed constraints on individual behaviour are often necessary to
reach collective goals and produce public goods (Gram et al., 2018b,c).
Our ﬁndings indicate a need for considering conceptions of agency,
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which distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate interference
(Gram et al., 2017).
Future research may continue to explore the complex ethical, social,
and behavioural implications of combining participatory women's
groups with cash transfers. Previous quantitative and qualitative studies
have framed women's agency over cash transfers primarily as an issue
of intra-household gender inequality (Adato and Roopnaraine, 2010;
Yildirim et al., 2014; Slater and Mphale, 2008; Scott et al., 2017). With
few exceptions (Forde et al., 2011), hard and soft conditions on bene-
ﬁciary spending are rarely considered manifestations of power. Future
work might analyse such power relations through an intersectional lens
which combines insights from both gender, community and NGO
realms. Understanding such intersections may be key to determining
whether policy-makers should necessarily think of our observed soft
conditions as problematic or simply emblematic of the ‘necessary con-
tradictions’ (Cornish and Ghosh, 2007) inherent in combining partici-
patory women's groups with cash transfers.
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